Phys. Rev. E 63, 030901(R) (2001) [4 pages]

Social games in a social network

Abstract

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Guillermo Abramson^1,2,* and Marcelo Kuperman^1,†
¹Centro Atómico Bariloche and Instituto Balseiro, 8400 San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina
²Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Cdad. de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Received 9 June 2000; revised 5 October 2000; published 20 February 2001

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs, produce a variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribution towards the study of social phenomena and transitions governed by the topology of the community.

URL:

http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevE.63.030901

DOI:

10.1103/PhysRevE.63.030901

PACS:

87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le, 84.35.+i, 87.23.Kg

^*Email address: abramson@cab.cnea.gov.ar

^†Email address: kuperman@cab.cnea.gov.ar

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Phys. Rev. E 63, 030901(R) (2001) [4 pages]

Social games in a social network